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I. INTRODUCTION
A IR TURBULENCE, in its various forms, has been providing
Z ir travelers with a bumpy ride since the early days of avia-
tion. Over this time, turbulence has caused many injuries and
some fatalities. Standard negligence analysis has ruled this area
for a long time.1 In air turbulence litigation, pilots' actions are
scrutinized for the appropriate standard of care and liability at-
taches accordingly.2 Generally, courts refuse to allow plaintiffs
* Candidate forJ.D., May 2000, Southern Methodist University School of Law;
BScE Electrical Engineering, Queen's University at Kingston, Ontario, Canada,
1992. The author is a Patent Associate in the Law Department of Texas Instru-
ments Incorporated in Dallas, Texas.
This comment won the 1999 Best Comment Competition, sponsored by Jack-
son Walker, L.L.P.
I See Annotation, Liability of Carrier By Air for Injury or Death of Passenger Due to
Downdraft, Updraft, or Turbulence, 73 A.L.R.2d 379 (1997).
2 See id.
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to use the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in turbulence cases and,
likewise, do not consider strict liability appropriate either.3 Con-
sidering the advancement in detection technology, the accept-
ance of air travel as part of everyday life in today's society, the
imbalance in access to information and knowledge in this area,
and the number of turbulence-related accidents, these legal the-
ories deserve serious consideration. Additionally, considering
the unique technology issues and knowledge associated with avi-
ation litigation in general, other potentially attractive ap-
proaches deserve investigation. These include, for example, a
requirement of mandatory expert testimony before a finding of
negligence, or implementation of a preflight weather-briefing
version of the doctrine of informed consent, both analogous to
medical malpractice and argued briefly in several cases.
Turbulence comes in various forms, each presenting a differ-
ent set of factual and legal problems. The type of turbulence
involved in a particular case should play a significant role in de-
termining the type of legal analysis to be employed. For in-
stance, res ipsa loquitur or even strict liability may be the
appropriate doctrines to invoke in many weather-related or
wake turbulence incidents, but may not yet be appropriate for
most clear air turbulence cases. Therefore, comprehending the
differences among the common types of turbulence encoun-
tered by air carriers may be of critical importance in under-
standing how to resolve a particular case.
In addition to the airline's liability for pilot actions or omis-
sions, issues involving liability and indemnification of air traffic
controllers (ATCs) will be discussed. ATCs play an important
role once an aircraft has entered into their coverage area, espe-
cially in instrument flight rule (IFR) conditions. For the pur-
poses of determining liability, an ATC's actions are particularly
important in cases involving wake turbulence. This comment
will explore the traditional negligence analysis in this context,
causation problems including access to information and knowl-
edge, and the "pilot in command" concept.
With respect to encounters with turbulence in international
flights, the applicability and impact of the Warsaw Convention
will also be considered briefly. The Convention may have an
effect on potential liability and bring about variations from state
tort law normally applicable to this area.




Finally, various airline and government defenses such as con-
tributory negligence and assumption of risk will be considered.
Specific areas of interest include the application of these de-
fenses in connection with the "preflight-weather briefing in-
formed consent" scenario and in situations where passengers fail
to fasten their seat belts or otherwise fail to take the necessary
precautions under the circumstances.
II. BACKGROUND
Air turbulence has caused many injuries and some fatalities
over the years. In fact, Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
statistics reveal that in the United States approximately fifty-
eight airline passengers are injured every year by air turbulence
while not wearing their seat belts.' During the period from 1981
through December 1997, there were 342 reports of turbulence
affecting major air carriers resulting in three fatalities, eighty se-
rious injuries, and 769 minor injuries.5 The same report reveals
that turbulence is the leading cause of injuries to airline passen-
gers and flight attendants in non-fatal accidents.6 Although
these numbers are substantial, there are indications that the
numbers, in reality, are significantly higher.7 Regardless, the
numbers were high enough to spur the FAA to sponsor a na-
tional public awareness campaign, "Turbulence Happens,"
designed to educate airline passengers in ways to avoid injuries
caused by turbulence." Additionally, a joint industry and gov-
ernment consulting group consisting of the FAA, McDonnell
Douglas, and the Air Transport Association (ATA) is distribut-
ing a manual and video tape program titled "Turbulence Educa-
tion and Training Aid" to assist flight crews and controllers in
predicting and handling turbulent weather conditions in an ef-
4 See FAA, Facts About Turbulence (visited Sept. 25, 1998) <http://www.faa.gov/
apa/turb/Facts/fact.htm> [hereinafter Facts About Turbulence].
5 See id.
6 See id.
7 See Dateline: Things That Go Bump in Hight (NBC news broadcast 1998) (re-
porting that the NBC news program Dateline contacted various aviation experts
who believe that the number of injuries is easily 10 times that reported by the
FAA); see also Turbulence Data Show Importance of Using Seat Belts, AIR SAFETY WK.,
July 7, 1997, at 7 (stating that the number of injuries reported in the FAA's data
base may seriously underestimate the extent of the problem. According to a spe-
cial report on airline safety in the July/August issue of Consumer's Digest, more
than 7,600 people were injured in turbulence-related incidents last year.).
8 See Kim M. Mason, Clear Skies Don't Always Mean a Smooth FRight, WESTCHESTER
Coutrv Bus. J., January .19, 1998, at 21.
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fort to reduce injuries and aircraft damage caused by severe tur-
bulence.9 The following are a few of the more recent incidents
that have contributed to this heightened awareness.1" In De-
cember 1997, a United Airlines Boeing 747 encountered clear
air turbulence en route from Japan to Hawaii.11 The airplane
first bounced upward, pushing passengers into their seats with a
force of nearly two Gs and then, after hitting a downdraft, threw
passengers from their seats with some hitting the ceiling and
overhead luggage compartments. 12 This jolt killed one passen-
ger and injured seventy-four others, as well as nine flight attend-
ants. 3 In March 1998, six people were injured when a Delta
Airlines Boeing 757 flying from Los Angeles to Tampa hit a
pocket of turbulence while flying through severe thunder-
storms.14 On December 5, 1996, an American Airlines jetliner
encountered clear air turbulence over Colorado injuring sixteen
people.' 5 Over a one-week period inJune 1995, there were forty
passengers injured on three flights. 16 Encounters with this phe-
nomenon are neither new nor diminishing with improved de-
tection technology, but rather these encounters arguably appear
to be increasing.
17
Air turbulence is generally defined in various forms. The sta-
tistics provided above are based on the FAA's definition of tur-
bulence as "air movement that normally cannot be seen and
9 See Turbulence Training Aid Released by Joint Government/Industry Team, AIR
SAFETY WK., August 4, 1997, at 7.
10 For an FAA sampling of reported injury-causing turbulence encounters for
the period of February 20, 1996, to March 27, 1997, see Turbulence Data Show
Importance of Using Seat Belts, AIR SAFETY WK., supra note 7.




14 See Air turbulence injures six on Delta flight (visited March 7, 1998) <http://
www.nando.net/newsroom/ntn/nation/030798/
nation22_3813_noframes.html>.
15 See Mason, supra note 8.
16 See Laura Bly, FAA May Tighten Airplane Seat Belt Rules, STAR TRIB., METRO
EDITION (Minneapolis, MN), August 20, 1995, at 2G.
17 Many incidents have been reported over the last few years causing air travel-
ers to believe that encounters with severe turbulence has significantly increased.
However, "[a] spokesman for the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
says he does not know if the planes are encountering an unusual level of turbu-
lence lately, or if this is simply a case of the media putting extra focus on this type
of transportation hazard." Jennifer Brill, Air Passengers Wonder if We're Going




often occurs unexpectedly. It can be created by a number of
different conditions, including atmospheric pressures, jet
streams, mountain waves, cold or warm fronts, or thunder-
storms. Turbulence can occur when the sky appears to be
clear.""i This definition obviously leaves out all forms of wake
turbulence (turbulence caused by other planes), but generally
encompasses most other forms of turbulence. Turbulence has
also been defined by aviation experts as "random, unpredictable
motion that occurs at the boundary between layers of air moving
at different speeds."19 In the context of legal analysis it is espe-
cially useful to make an attempt to separate turbulence into at
least three manageable categories, each corresponding to the
manner by which the turbulence is created. The first suggested
category is weather-related turbulence, including what has also
been termed storm-related turbulence, or convective turbu-
lence; the second category is clear air turbulence; and the third
category is wake turbulence or vortex turbulence.
Weather-related turbulence, as its name indicates, is any tur-
bulence related to unsettled weather conditions such as thun-
derstorms. Storm clouds or heavy rains are generally reliable
indicators of the possible presence of this form of turbulence.2 0
Conversely, clear air turbulence is generally more difficult to
detect and can be encountered without warning.21 Clear air tur-
bulence, again as its name indicates, is very loosely defined as
turbulence without clouds.22 One area where clear air turbu-
lence can occur is at a boundary of the jet stream. 3 The jet
stream is "a broad ribbon of high-speed air moving from west to
east at altitudes of 30,000 to 45,000 feet ...."-2 At the jet stream
boundaries, "where it moves over slower air, windshear can gen-
erate severe turbulence. 2 5 During the winter months, the jet
stream lies at lower altitudes and latitudes causing such turbu-
lence to become more common.26 Another place clear air tur-
bulence can be encountered is above or near mountain
18 Facts About Turbulence, supra note 4.
19 Ron Cowen, Clearing the Air about Turbulence, SCIENCE NEws, June 27, 1998, at
408.
20 See id.
21 SeeJack Williams, Forecasts that Fly, WFATHERWISE, December, 1994, at 26.
22 See id.
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ranges.27 "When an air mass slams into a mountain, it's forced
upward. This parcel of air, denser than the surrounding air at
that altitude, subsequently sinks back down to below its original
height. The oscillations generated as the parcel continues to
rise and fall create" this form of clear air turbulence s.2  These air
disturbances may be found fairly distant from the mountain as it
may take a while for a disturbance to settle. 29 The effects of this
type of turbulence may be felt at altitudes up to 20,000 feet
above a 12,000-foot mountain range. 30 For example, it is noted
that wind blowing over the Colorado Rockies may create clear
air turbulence high above the plains of Kansas. 1 A similar phe-
nomenon occurs with respect to other substantial surface condi-
tions such as buildings, bridges, and structures of that nature. 2
In addition, clear air turbulence can be triggered when an area
of air at a low altitude is heated by the energy released by the
sun-warmed ground or by a group of forming clouds.33 When
the heated area of air rises, the wind-flow pattern at higher alti-
tudes is distorted and chaotic motion is generated. 34 The dis-
tinction between clear air turbulence and weather-related
turbulence is not always clear-cut.35 The overlap occurs because
unsettled weather can create turbulence as far as twenty miles
away from the storm regions in areas where clouds may be few
in number.3 6
Wake turbulence is caused by the movement of airplane
wings, forcing air downward under the wings and creating





.1 See Williams, supra note 21.
32 Turbulence associated with these surface conditions will not likely create
enough turbulence to affect large and heavy aircraft but can generate enough to
affect smaller air carriers. See Arrow Aviation, Inc. v. Moore and Socony Mobil
Co., 266 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1959) (recognizing strong wind conditions, together
with ground conditions including buildings, hangars, and a railroad track (built
on a twenty foot dike, with railroad cars) were considered likely to have caused a
small Model 140 Cessna airplane to crash on approach for landing).




37 See FAA FLIGHT STANDARDS SERVICE AND NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE, ADVI-




'wing tip vortices' are the most predominant parts of aircraft
wake turbulence and their rotational force is dependent upon
the wingloading, gross weight, and speed of the generating air-
craft. The vortices from medium to heavy aircraft can be of ex-
tremely high velocity and hazardous to smaller aircraft." 38
This form of turbulence can remain in an area for periods
ranging from ten to twelve minutes and the paths of these vorti-
ces will continue until they strike the ground and are dis-
integrated.3 9 Large helicopters are also capable of creating
wake turbulence significant enough to upset other aircraft.40
The ability of pilots or ground weather personnel to detect
the presence of turbulence also varies among the different types
of turbulence. Weather-related turbulence can be directly de-
tectable in many instances, and if not directly detectable, is at
least foreseeable considering its association with clouds and
storm systems. In the case of well-developed storms, ground
weather stations and on-board systems are capable of detecting
many turbulent conditions. Turbulence within areas of precipi-
tation is detectable with current on-board radar technology. 41
In addition, pilots are trained to maintain a safe distance of ap-
proximately twenty miles from these systems in order to avoid
the otherwise undetectable turbulence that can be felt at their
boundaries.4 2
Clear air turbulence, on the other hand, is much more diffi-
cult to detect. Currently, knowledge of the various causes of
clear air turbulence can be a pilot's only real tool in anticipating
a clear air turbulence encounter. This, however, may be chang-
ing. Recently, there has been much discussion concerning tech-
nological breakthroughs in this area that may put detection
technology in commercial airliners within the next five to seven
years and some testing in commercial aircraft within three
years. 3 Current radar technology uses radio waves that are only
capable of sensing relatively large particles such as rain or
snow.44 These particles do not exist in clear air turbulence, how-
8 FAA, ORDER 7110.65, AIR TRAFFIc CONTROL, PILOT/CONTROLLER GLOSSARY
(1999).
39 SeeYates v. United States, 497 F.2d 878, 881 (10th Cir. 1974).
40 See Dyer v. United States, 832 F.2d 1062, 1068 (9th Cir. 1987).
41 See Robert Goyer, Lidar Detects CAT, FLYING, July 1998, at 33.
42 See McKinney v. Air Venture Corp., 578 S.W.2d 849, 857 (Tex. Civ. App. -
Ft. Worth, 1979, no writ) (using pilot expert testimony).
43 See Cowen, supra note 19.
- See id.
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ever, and, hence, are not detectable with the current technol-
ogy." One detection strategy researchers have developed is a
laser radar system that emits an infrared light in front of the
plane.46 The light is reflected back to its source by tiny dust
particles, volcanic ash, and other natural aerosols. 47 If these par-
ticles are in turbulence, their motion will change the frequency
of the reflected light.4 a This system was tested recently and was
able to detect light and moderate turbulence three to four miles
ahead of the aircraft. 49 This system needs to be improved to
allow enough time after detection to give passengers an oppor-
tunity to buckle up and prepare for the ensuing turbulence.
In another effort, meteorologists at the National Center for
Atmospheric Research have developed software for installation
in commercial airliners.5 ° The software uses existing instrumen-
tation to measure wind currents and areas of turbulence and
then sends these measurements down to a ground station that
synthesizes the information into a picture of the ebb and flow of
air currents.51 This system has already been installed in five
United Airlines Boeing 737s and 757s with plans to equip an-
other 200 United Airlines aircraft this year.52 If successful, the
equipment will be installed in about 500 commercial jets from
other airlines within two years, providing a very detailed scan of
the areas of turbulence over the United States. 53 Implementa-
tion of these types of systems could impact the question of air-
line negligence in failing to avoid turbulence that they would
not have otherwise been able to detect.
Wake turbulence is also difficult to directly detect. The vorti-
ces created by other aircraft are not visible. Like weather-re-
lated turbulence, however, Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs)
as well as other material, such as FAA Advisory Circulars, warn
pilots of the possible presence of this type of turbulence and
detail the procedures to take in order to avoid it.54 Arguably,






50 See Fred Bayles, Panic at 33,000 feet, USA TODAY, FINAL EDITION, December




54 See In re N-500L Cases, 691 F.2d 15, 28 (1st Cir. 1982).
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weather-related turbulence. An ATC should provide ample sep-
aration of the aircraft and issue any necessary warnings. A pilot
with knowledge of the regulations and procedures should know
of the possibility of wake turbulence and be able to take the
proper measures to avoid it.55 These measures may include ma-
neuvering around it or touching down at a location farther
down the runway.56 As with weather-related turbulence, detec-
tion is not necessarily critical to the negligence analysis as long
as precautions could have been taken to avoid areas where it was
known or should have been known that there was a possibility
for turbulence to exist.5 7
III. AIRLINE LIABILITY ANALYSIS
A. GENERAL NEGLIGENCE ANALYSIS
Actions for personal injuries caused by an encounter with air
turbulence, and based on negligence of an airline's employees,
are tort claims governed by state common law and are neither
expressly preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978
(ADA) nor implicitly preempted by the Federal Aviation Act of
1958.58 With respect to express preemption by the ADA, it has
been held that "'a state law action for personal injuries sus-
tained as a result of an airline's alleged negligence' is not re-
lated to airline 'rates, routes or services"' as required by the
ADA.59
The traditional requirements for a finding of negligence in-
clude: (1) a recognized duty requiring the person to conform to
a certain standard of care; (2) a failure of the person to conform
to that standard (i.e. a breach of that duty); (3) causation; and
(4) actual loss or damage to the interests of another. 60 Airlines
are a common carriers of passengers and, accordingly, most
courts have attributed to them an elevated duty of care towards
their passengers.
55 See id.; see also Dyer, 832 F.2d at 1069-71; AVIATION WEATHER, supra note 37 at
89.
56 See Dyer, 832 F.2d at 1070; see also AVIATION WEATHER, supra note 37 at 89.
57 See Dyer, 832 F.2d at 1068-71.
58 See Trinidad v. American Airlines, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 521, 526 (S.D.N.Y.
1996).
59 Id. (citing Butcher v. City of Houston, 813 F. Supp 515, 517-18 (S.D. Tex.
1993) ("'[T]he services' of an airline ... necessarily exclude an air carrier's com-
mon law duty to exercise ordinary care.").
60 SeeW. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30,
at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
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[A] n airline is required to exercise with respect to its passengers
the highest degree of care consistent with practical operation of
the conveyance .... However, a common carrier is not required
to guarantee the safety of its passengers against all injuries, but
only those which the exercise of the highest degree of care could
have averted.61
New York may be the only state apparently refusing to hold com-
mon carriers to that elevated standard.62 Although the standard
of care applied by most courts is quite high, plaintiffs are often
unsuccessful in suing airlines for injuries caused by turbulence
because of the difficulty in proving negligence.
Small v. Transcontinental & Western Air is an example of an
early case analyzing the potential liability of an airline for inju-
ries caused by an airplane's encounter with a downdraft.63 The
analysis used by the court is typical of that still used by many
courts today. The court acknowledged that airplane encounters
with downdrafts were not uncommon and that
such a manifestation of nature, like the weather, is commonly
referred to as an act of God. So far as the weather is concerned it
cannot be denied that airplane operators take every precaution
against weather hazards. If it is possible to determine or even
suspect that under certain conditions downdrafts are likely or
possible, it would appear to be the duty of a prudent operator to
take whatever precautions are necessary or available to guard
against dangerous consequences. 64
In Small, the plaintiff was a passenger on a TWA airplane fly-
ing from Kansas to Los Angeles.65 While flying over Texas, the
plane encountered turbulence and dropped so fast that a flight
attendant flew to the ceiling of the plane and most of the pas-
sengers were thrown from their seats.66 As a result, the plaintiff
was badly injured.67 She argued that, although the flight had
become rough, the pilot failed to illuminate the "Fasten Seat
61 Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Silber, 324 F.2d 38, 39 (5th Cir. 1963).
62 See Karuba v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 87 Civ. 1455, 1991 U.S. Dist LEXIS
4204 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 1991) (dealing with a passenger who was injured during an
airplane's encounter with clear air turbulence. The court provided that a com-
mon carrier "owes to its passengers 'reasonable care under the circumstances.'").
63 Small v. Transcontinental & Western Air, Inc., 216 P.2d 36 (Cal. Ct. App.
1950).
64 Id. at 37.
65 See id. at 36.




Belts" sign.' The defendant did not dispute that the sign was
not on, but contended that there was no need for it.6" The
court held that there was ample evidence of the roughness of
the flight prior to the accident supporting the verdict that the
defendant was negligent.70 Therefore, although this was a clear
air turbulence encounter and not directly detectable, the unsta-
ble conditions leading up to the big jolt were such that the pilot
should have taken the necessary precautions to warn of the pos-
sibility of this type of encounter.
Similarly, in Cudney v. Braniff Airways,71 the court provided
that
where science does afford or comes to afford a forewarning of a
weather condition attended by the probability or reasonable like-
lihood of a hazard of dangerous turbulence, it would be too
much to say that the airline need not anticipate and take the
commensurate precautions reasonably available to guard against
the hazard ....
In Cudney, the plaintiff was a passenger injured when the de-
fendant's DC-3 airplane encountered weather-related turbu-
lence on a flight from Missouri to Nebraska.73 The air began to
get turbulent during the flight.74 There was some cloud-to-
cloud and cloud-to-ground lightning, it began to rain, and sev-
eral minutes later the plane experienced a sudden and severe
downdraft. 5 The "fasten seat belt" sign was on, and the plaintiff
testified that she had her seat belt on, but that she was neverthe-
less thrown upward and across the aisle. 76 The ceiling and the
metal rail of the luggage rack were dented, likely by contact with
the plaintiffs head and body.77 The defendant's meteorologist
testified that light turbulence had been forecast prior to the
flight.78 In addition, the stated weather conditions forecast cu-
mulus clouds along the route, which generally develop into
thunderstorms. 79 The meteorologist testified that where thun-
- See id.
69 See Small, 216 P.2d at 37.
70 See id. at 410-11.
71 300 S.W.2d 412 (Mo. 1957).
72 Id. at 417.
7- See id. at 413.
74 See id. at 414.
75 See id. at 414-15.
76 See id. at 415.
77 See id.
78 See Cudney, 300 S.W.2d at 416.
79 See id.
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derstorms develop, there are frequently columns of rain present
and downdrafts and updrafts could be expected.80 He further
provided that generally, if the pilot can, he ought to avoid flying
into such a situation and "'if you decide to fly into [a thunder-
storm] you're taking a chance as to whether you're-going to
run into one of these so-called cells or not.' "81 An experienced
pilot, as a witness for the plaintiff, testified that "'if you have a
thunderstorm accompanied by a heavy rainstorm and light-
ning-to avoid them if possible.' But, 'if they (pilots) do for
some reason have to go through it,' it is the custom to slow
down."8 2 Here, the pilot was warned of the potential thunder-
storms, observed cloud-to-cloud lightning, and entered rain a
few minutes before the jolt.83 The pilot testified that there was
no reason to slow down because doing so would have made him
late and they did not operate that way if they could help it.84
The court correctly held that the jury was reasonable in finding
the defendant negligent for failing to take the necessary precau-
tion of either circumnavigating the storm or diminishing his
speed in passing through the area."5 Especially with weather-
related turbulence, even if the turbulence is not directly detecta-
ble, the foreseeability of its presence from signs of inclement
weather could be enough to render the defendant negligent if
he fails to take the necessary precautions dictated by the circum-
stances at hand. The evidence and testimony, particularly by the
defendant's own witnesses, made the decision a relatively easy
one for the court in Cudney.
Ness v. West Coast Airlines is an example of a case dealing with a
passenger injured on the defendant's airplane from an encoun-
ter with what appeared to be clear air turbulence.8 6 The "Fasten
Seat Belt" signs were not illuminated at the time of the encoun-
ter, and the plaintiffs seat belt was loosely fastened., 7 The
plaintiff provided evidence showing that: (1) there were
cumulo-nibulus clouds earlier in the area south of where they
took off, (2) there was a low pressure area along the course of





84 See Cudney, 3000 S.W.2d at 416-17.
85 See id. at 418.
86 Ness v. West Coast Airlines, Inc., 410 P.2d 965 (Idaho 1965).
87 See id. at 966.
1174
AIR TURBULENCE LIABILITY
the accident occurred over mountainous terrain."' A meteorol-
ogist testified that these weather conditions were factors that can
contribute to air turbulence.8 9 The evidence showed that this
information was available to the defendant's pilot.90 The lower
court's judgment for the defendant was reversed and re-
manded. 1 The court held that with respect to proximate cause,
"it was sufficient to show that the probability of air turbulence,
and the likelihood of injury to passengers therefrom, in the ab-
sence of warning thereof, was foreseeable. 9 2 Thus, the plaintiff
raised sufficient evidence in the case to show that even though
they encountered clear air turbulence, which is not directly de-
tectable, the encounter may have been foreseeable given the
various indicators available to the pilot.
Dunbar v. American Airlines, Inc., is an example of a case where
the plaintiff, a passenger on the defendant's airplane, was in-
jured when the plane encountered turbulence, however, she was
not successful in her action against the airline.9 3 The pilot testi-
fied that he had 25 years of flying experience; that he had
checked the weather and there was only one thunderstorm re-
ported; that this thunderstorm was too far south to be on the
regular course of the flight plan; that he had flown this particu-
lar route many times encountering similar wind conditions; that
the conditions looked the same to him with no lightening, no
thunder, and no hail; and that all of a sudden the plane "started
down at an alarming rate of speed."94 The Oklahoma Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment of the jury and found no error in
not directing a verdict for the plaintiff who claimed that the de-
fendant was negligent in flying "through a dangerous thunder-
storm, when they knew, or in the exercise of ordinary care
would have known, that the thunderstorm was turbulent, vio-
lent, unstable and unsafe for safe passage. 95 It appeared that
the plaintiff simply did not have evidence that could counter the
pilot's testimony regarding whether or not he should have
known that turbulence might be encountered.




92 Id. at 969.
93 Dunbar v. American Airlines, Inc., 376 P.2d 226, 227 (Okla. 1962).
94 Id. at 228.
95 Id. at 227.
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Dyer v. United States is an example of a case exploring negli-
gence of a pilot in an encounter with wake turbulence.9 6 A pas-
senger was killed when the Piper Turbo Arrow aircraft in which
he was flying crashed at an airport during a landing attempt
shortly after a large HH-3 Coast Guard helicopter had landed.9 7
The pilot testified that he saw the helicopter approach the run-
way, and that he purposely slowed down and extended his ap-
proach to avoid the helicopter's wake turbulence.98 The court
discussed excerpts from FAA Advisory Circulars, FARs, and an
Airman's Information Manual, all dealing with the presence and
avoidance of wake turbulence.9 9 The court stated that the pilot
"had a duty to be, and actually was, familiar with information
regarding wake turbulence avoidance" and although he "pro-
longed his approach.., those measures were insufficient to pre-
vent the accident." ' ° The "primary duty was on [the pilot] to
understand and safely avoid the hazards left by the helicopter's
wake. He breached this duty by following too closely . *..."101
Thus, the court affirmed a finding as to the pilot's negligence. 10 2
This case is an example of the potential liability of an airline in a
wake turbulence encounter even though the turbulence itself is
not detectable. In this case, the airport did not have a control
tower and, therefore, the court did not reach the common is-
sues regarding liability of ATCs, causation, and indemnification.
B. ACTS OF NEGLIGENCE IN AIR TURBULENCE INCIDENTS
There are many ways for an airline to be negligent. A few
examples of these negligent acts are prevalent in turbulence
cases. One example, as seen in Cudney v. Braniff is flying into or
in the area of a storm.103 It is well known that weather-related
turbulence, especially turbulence of a severe nature, can be
found in the vicinity of storms or other inclement weather.
Therefore, if a pilot flies into such an area, that act can consti-
tute negligence in and of itself. As discussed above, a pilot may
be negligent even if he does not fly directly into the storm area
96 Dyer v. United States, 832 F.2d 1062 (9th Cir. 1987).
97 See id. at 1064-65.
98 See id. at 1064.
9 See id. at 1068-69.
oo Id. at 1070.
101 Id.
102 See Dyer, 832 F.2d at 1071.
103 Cudney, 300 S.W.2d at 417-18.
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but merely fails to keep a proper distance from the area.' In
McKinney v. Air Venture Corp., the plaintiff's wife was killed when
the defendant's plane crashed after encountering windshear.'0 5
The court found that the pilot flew the plane within fifteen stat-
ute miles of the approaching storm.'06 The court noted that
both plaintiff and defense expert witnesses had testified that an
area within fifteen to twenty miles of a thunderstorm was a dan-
ger area, and evidence revealed that the pilot, at the time of the
crash, was well within this range. 0 7 The court stated that:
wind shear is one possible part of a severe thunderstorm, just as
rain, hail, lightning and turbulence within the cell itself are
possibilities.
The fact that a windshear is somewhat more difficult to predict
or detect than some of the other phenomena associated with a
storm front of this size and intensity should cause a prudent pilot
to exercise greater caution. This is especially true in situations
like this where, as the evidence indicates, the pilot had access to
information all of which indicated that the storm front in ques-
tion was particularly severe ...
Because of the possibility of extremely hazardous flight condi-
tions in the vicinity of thunderstorms ... it has long been the
practice of pilots to avoid them. The possibility of the presence
of a wind shear is simply one of several reasons to avoid the area
close to thunderstorms, especially that area lying directly in the
storm's path.10 8
It is, therefore, apparent that flying into or near inclement
weather can amount to negligence. Also, as provided in Cudney,
failure to slow down when storms or turbulence are encoun-
tered can constitute negligence.10 9 Thus, for weather-related
turbulence, flying into or near potentially hazardous weather or
failing to take necessary precautions once these conditions are
encountered are common acts of negligence.
As seen in Ness v. West Coast Airlines, the pilot need not have
knowledge of the presence of turbulence or inclement weather
or even the possibility of its presence, and negligence can still be
104 See McKinney, 758 S.W. 2d at 857.
105 Id. at 850 (defining windshear as "the leading edge of cold air outflow from
severe thunderstorms").
106 See id. at 859.
107 See id.
108 Id. at 859-60.
100 Cudney, 300 S.W.2d. at 416-18.
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found if such weather information was available but the pilot
failed to obtain it.110
Not only can the pilot's failure to obtain weather reports that
could have warned him of possible turbulent weather constitute
negligence, but failure of one flight to warn other flights or
ground weather stations of these weather conditions can also
constitute negligence. In addition, airline negligence can be
found in the failure of weather dispatchers to advise flights of
these weather conditions. Both acts of negligence occurred in
Stiles v. National Airlines."' In that case, plaintiffs intestates
were killed when defendant's plane, Flight 470, crashed in the
Gulf of Mexico after a probable encounter with severe turbu-
lence associated with a storm in the area.1 12 Another of the de-
fendant's planes, Flight 917, had preceded Flight 470 by two-
and-one half hours and had encountered worsening weather
and severe turbulence."1 Flight 917 made no direct report of
this weather to Flight 470 nor did it report at all until two hours
after the turbulence had been encountered.1 14 In addition, the
reports that were finally made were never relayed by defendant's
weather dispatchers until Flight 470 asked for weather at a time
in which it was already surrounded by severe thunderstorms." 5
The court held that, among other things, the crash was proxi-
mately caused by the following acts of defendant's negligence:
[f]ailure of Flight 917 to advise Flight 470, or [defendant's]
Flight-Control office for the benefit of Flight 470, of the severe
weather encountered at the time it was encountered, as required
by defendant's own rules and by the Civil Air Regula-
tions; . . . and Flight 917's failure to make a full report of these
turbulent weather conditions at any time before Flight 470 was
lost[;]
and failure of defendant's weather dispatchers to advise Flight
470 on numerous opportunities of the forecast of severe turbu-
lence in the area."16
The failure of Flight 917 to report the weather phenomena
essential to the safety of other flights would now be considered
110 Ness, 410 P.2d at 967-68.
111 Stiles v. National Airlines, Inc., 161 F. Supp 125 (E.D. La. 1958), affd, 268
F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1959).
112 See id. at 130.
113 See id. at 127.
114 See id.
115 See id. at 127-28.
116 Id. at 130-31.
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a violation of FAR 121,561 which requires:
(a) Whenever he encounters a meteorological condition or an
irregularity in a ground or navigational facility, in flight, the
knowledge of which he considers essential to the safety of other
flights, the pilot in command shall notify an appropriate ground
station as soon as practicable.11
7
As Stiles indicates, the violation of a FAR can be used to show
negligence. Airlines operate under the authority of the FARs.118
FARs are always admissible in evidence, if pertinent to the issues
in the case, to establish "impartial and authoritative criteria" for
determining negligence. They are admissible in evidence
against an airline to establish "the proper standard of care
under the circumstances." 1 9 This stems from the principle of
law that violation of a regulation, which is usually interpreted as
fixing a standard of care, is evidence of negligence, and may in
some cases constitute negligence per se.1 20 This was also dis-
cussed in Dyer v. United States.1 21 In that case, the court also
looked at FAA Advisory Circulars and an Airman's Information
Manual to establish negligence.1 22 Airlines themselves develop
and use manuals that provide their own rules and standards for
both the operation and maintenance of their aircraft.1 2' These
manuals can also be looked to for establishing a standard of
care, the violation of which may constitute negligence.124
As alluded to above, even if the airline is not negligent in fly-
ing into a particular area, it may be negligent in its failure to
warn passengers of a potential encounter with turbulence. For
example, if a pilot flies directly into a storm or an area where
severe turbulence is likely, that in and of itself would constitute
negligence. Where a pilot flies into an area where turbulence is
only a possibility, such as the outer edges of a storm or in the
vicinity of mountains, flying into those areas may not itself con-
stitute negligence under the circumstances; yet negligence may
be still be founded on a failure to warn passengers of the possi-
bility of a turbulence encounter. Brittain v. Piedmont is an exam-
117 LEE S. KREINDLER, AvIATION ACCIDENT LAw § 2.10[10], at 2-59 (Mathew
Bender, revised 1998).
"1 See id. at 2-52.
119 Id. at 2-52 to 2-53.
120 See id. at 2-53.
12, Dyer, 832 F.2d at 1065.
122 See id.
123 See KREINDLER, supra note 117, at 2-54.
124 See id.
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ple of such a case. 25 The plaintiff was a passenger on the
defendant's plane. 126 The plaintiff was injured when he was
thrown to the ceiling of the washroom by a sudden encounter
with a severe downdraft. 127 There was some conflict in testi-
mony as to whether the seat belt light was on before the encoun-
ter. 12  The defendants knew that air turbulence was very
possible in the area they were flying due to the mountains of
Western North Carolina. 29 Therefore, if the airline in fact
failed to warn the passengers of the possibility of turbulence in
this area that would constitute negligence.13 0 If the airline did
in fact warn the passengers of the possibility of turbulence and
did not negligently encounter the turbulence, however, the air-
line would not be liable.
Even though the passengers are warned that turbulence is
possible by means of the "Fasten Seat Belt" sign, an airline may
still be liable if a flight attendant permits a passenger to get out
of his seat and proceed to the lavatory during turbulent
weather.' 3 1 In Urban v. Frontier Air Lines, after the weather had
become rough and turbulent, the plaintiff requested permission
to go the lavatory.' 32 The plaintiff was told by the flight attend-
ant to "wait a little while."1 33 The plaintiff complied and a few
minutes later, according to the plaintiff's testimony, the flight
attendant nodded her head telling the plaintiff "I think you can
go now.' 1 34 The plaintiff proceeded to the lavatory and when
the plane hit a down draft, she was thrown to the floor and sus-
tained injuries. 135 The court found that the permission pro-
vided by the flight attendant constituted negligence that was the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries. 36 The court pro-
vided that "a reasonable and prudent person would have known
or should have known that rough and turbulent weather would
have likely reoccurred before plaintiff returned to her seat." 37
125 Brittain v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 120 S.E.2d 72 (N.C. 1961).
126 See id.
127 See id.
128 See id. at 74-75.
129 See id. at 72.
130 See id. at 75-76.
13, See Urban v. Frontier Air Lines, 139 F. Supp. 288 (D. Wyo. 1956).




136 See id. at 290.
137 Urban, 139 F. Supp. at 290.
1180
AIR TURBULENCE LIABILITY
C. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES TO TRADITIONAL
NEGLIGENCE ANALYSIS
With the number of turbulence-related injuries seemingly on
the rise, the ever increasing pressure on airlines to cut costs and
meet demanding schedules, the imbalance of access to critical
information and knowledge regarding flights and surrounding
conditions, the highly technical nature of aviation and meteor-
ology, and the general acceptance of aviation as an everyday
form of travel in today's society, consideration must be given to
whether this traditional negligence-based liability standard is ap-
propriate. Whatever standard is used, it should encourage air-
lines to continue to research and improve detection technology
and their ability to avoid turbulence. Application of the current
negligence analysis may actually punish airlines for their efforts
by imposing a greater risk of negligence on them if they are
better able to detect turbulence. The chosen standard should
also encourage airlines to avoid the risk of encountering turbu-
lence by circumnavigating or canceling flights even though this
may have negative economic ramifications. The pilot testimony
in Cudney v Braniff Airways, discussed earlier, brought to light
the underlying pressure on pilots to maintain their increasingly
narrow flight schedules in order to satisfy their superiors and
passengers. 3 8 If an airline decides to either cancel a flight or
circumvent an area of potential turbulence, this could create
havoc with the outgoing flight schedules from the destination
airport and cause the plane to use up more fuel than allotted.
Faced with these consequences, a pilot may choose to take a di-
rect path even though there is some risk of encountering turbu-
lence along the way. Another consideration to be taken into
account when determining the proper liability standard is the
need for injured passengers to be able to hold an airline liable
for its lack of caution without being significantly hindered by an
inability to produce evidence of negligence or causation due to
an imbalance of access to such information. The current negli-
gence standard places the burden directly on the plaintiff pas-
senger to find this information and technical knowledge. Other
potential standards or doctrines would allow the burden to be
shifted or at least eased. With acceptance and integration of this
form of transportation into the fabric of today's society, there
arguably should be a higher standard of liability.
138 Cudney v. Braniff Airways, 300 S.W.2d. 412, 417 (Mo. 1957).
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Strict liability was applied in the early days of aviation, but as
the industry's safety record developed, this form of liability es-
sentially passed nearly a half of a century ago.'39 Some consider-
ation must be given to its application in this area. Specific
policy reasons for strict liability have been developed by the
courts. These include, for example, loss shifting, safety, supe-
rior knowledge, and insurance. 140 Loss shifting is based on the
theory that by incorporating the cost into the goods or services
and spreading it among the entire population of consumers, the
seller is better able to bear the damages than the consumer. 4 '
Theoretically, sellers who exercise the most care will capture the
market lost by the sellers who go out of business because they
are unable to bear the risk of damages.'4 2 Thus, loss shifting, in
theory, would encourage airlines to research and implement
safety measures, one of the more important goals set out above.
The second policy reason listed above is safety. Theoretically,
the seller will have a greater incentive to exercise a high degree
of care to avoid injuries for which it will be held strictly liable.'43
Thus, in theory, the more suits an airline can avoid, the lower
the ticket prices they can charge and the greater business they
will enjoy. This encourages airlines to implement greater safety
measures and develop detection and other safety enhancing
technology.
The third policy reason is superior knowledge. This policy
acknowledges the large imbalance in knowledge between a
seller and consumer. 44 In the airline context, pilots and air-
lines hold all the knowledge regarding potential risk of en-
counters with turbulence, weather forecasts, ability to
circumnavigate a risky area, etc. The uninformed passenger,
therefore, has little or no knowledge as to the potential danger
that lies ahead and the ability of the airlines to take precautions
for such encounters.
The last policy reason noted above is insurance. This takes
into account that the loss to the person injured can be great and
the risk of injury can be more easily and sensibly insured by the
goods or service provider, who can spread this cost out among
139 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, § 78 at 557.
140 See FRANKJ. VANDALL, STRICT LIABILITY, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYsis 20-
22 (1989).
141 See id. at 20-21.
142 See id. at 21.
143 See id.
144 See id. at 22.
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the entire consumer base.14 This is again applicable in the air
turbulence context.
Although these factors appear attractive, a court will not likely
adopt such a harsh form of liability at this time, especially with
their reluctance to even allow plaintiffs to use the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur in turbulence cases. 146 Because turbulence may be
an "act of God," and because it cannot be said at this time that a
turbulence encounter does not occur without negligence, courts
have generally viewed negligence as the appropriate standard.147
The premise that an encounter with turbulence does not occur
without negligence may be accurate with respect to most clear
air turbulence encounters, but other forms of turbulence may
be generally detectable or foreseeable and thus avoidable.
Traditional strict liability, however, does not differentiate and
would hold the airlines liable regardless of the type of turbu-
lence encountered. On one hand, this may seem too harsh an
outcome. On the other hand, this may be an appropriate
means of bootstraping the industry to higher levels of precau-
tion as well as achieving the goals set out above.
A strict liability system that is not so rigid in its application
may be more appropriate than traditional strict liability. Such a
system would differentiate a compensable injury from others not
recoverable under strict liability. Various threshold tests for in-
voking strict liability may be used that balance factors such as
shifting of the loss, social utility of the service, the likelihood of
injury, the nature of the injury, the cost of reducing the risk, the
ability to obtain insurance, the amount of judgment required of
the defendant in making the decision, and others. 4 ' In turbu-
lence cases, the type of turbulence encountered may constitute
an additional threshold factor. If the evidence shows that the
turbulence was associated with anything other than clear air,
then this factor would weigh heavily towards application of strict
liability. The inherent problem with this approach is that it
would still require the plaintiff to uncover evidence as to the
type of turbulence involved and, thus, not entirely eliminate the
problems associated with an imbalance in access to information.
Also, this modification of the strict liability analysis would dimin-
145 See id.
146 See Kohler, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 725 ("In the instant case, we have a turbulence
mishap and generally res ipsa loquitur has not been applied where natural condi-
tions affect the airplane's operation.").
147 See supra Part III.A.
148 See VANDALL, supra note 140, at 119-120.
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ish the benefit of encouraging airlines to accelerate develop-
ment of clear air turbulence detection technology. This
diminished incentive would likely result under this altered
scheme because, similar to the outcome in a standard negli-
gence analysis, the less knowledge airlines have regarding clear
air turbulence, the less likely they would be held strictly liable
for encounters with it.
This brings us to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. Although
viewed by some courts as "strict liability in disguise," 149 it is
clearly a distinct doctrine with characteristics that may be more
appropriate for handling the problems in this area. Res ipsa lo-
quitur simply allows negligence to be proved by circumstantial
evidence. 50 The conditions for its application are:
(1) the event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur
in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused by
an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the
defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action
or contribution on the part of the plaintiff51
Some courts further require a fourth condition, "that evi-
dence ... must be more readily accessible to the defendant than
to the plaintiff. ' 152 Although some do not believe that this
fourth condition can ever be controlling, 15 3 the inclusion of this
fourth condition should not be an obstacle in this area anyhow
since evidence in turbulence accidents will always be more ac-
cessible to the defendant than to the plaintiff.
Confusion among the courts exists as to the exact procedural
effect of res ipsa loquitur1 54 The majority of courts invoke the
doctrine by simply allowing circumstantial evidence to support a
finding for the plaintiff if, in the absence of direct evidence, the
circumstantial evidence indicates that the most plausible expla-
nation for the plaintiffs injury is the negligence of the defend-
ant.'55 The basic significance of res ipsa loquitur is that it allows
the circumstantial evidence submitted by the plaintiff to get to a
jury, and thus prevents summary judgment for the defendant. 56
149 See Mark F. Grady, Res Ipsa Loquitur and Compliance Error, 142 U. PA. L. REv.
887, 893-94 (1994).
150 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, § 39, at 242.
151 Id. at 244.
152 Id.
153 See id. at 254.
154 See id. at 257.
155 See id.
156 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, at 258-59.
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Any inference of negligence to be drawn from the circumstan-
tial evidence is left to the jury, which is permitted, but not com-
pelled to find it.157 In most jurisdictions the burden of proof
does not shift to the defendant, nor does the burden of intro-
ducing evidence, although in some cases, if he fails to do so, he
may risk an adverse jury verdict. 158 Some states hold that it does
create a presumption of negligence, which may yield a directed
verdict if the defendant fails to proffer evidence to meet it, while
others simply shift the burden to the defendant thereby requir-
ing him to go forward with an explanation.1 5 9 Other states, as
indicated earlier, require the defendant to possess superior
knowledge before invoking the doctrine. 6 ° A few states main-
tain they do not recognize the doctrine at all, yet apply different
rules that essentially amount to the same principle. 6 ' While
some states deny the plaintiff use of the doctrine if he has
merely pleaded some specific negligence, other states view the
production of specific proof as consistent with the use of res ipsa
loquitur. 16
2
It is well accepted that res ipsa loquitur is generally applicable
to aviation accidents since "commercial airlines generally do not
crash if due care has been exercised."163 For turbulence inci-
dents, however, courts have generally not considered res ipsa
loquitur appropriate.' 64 In Cudney v. Midcontinent, the plaintiff,
a passenger injured when the defendant's plane suddenly en-
countered turbulence, was not allowed to use the doctrine. In
determining whether the doctrine was applicable the court
asked:
Is it possible, in the present, to say that it is now the common
experience of mankind that commercial airliners do not sud-
denly lurch and drop in flight and then resume their course with-
out mishap except through failure to exercise due care? If so
there is no reason why the doctrine should not apply to airliners
as it does to other common carriers. 165
157 See id. at 258.
158 See id.
159 See id.; see also KREINDLER, supra note 117, at 2-31.
160 See KREINDLER, supra note 117, at 2-31.
161 See id.
162 See id.
163 David Mactavish and John Scott Hoff, Things That Go Bump in the Flight, In-
Flight Turbulence Injuries, THE AIR AND SPACE LAWYER, Summer 1998, at 22.
14 See Cudney v. Midcontinent Airlines, Inc., 254 S.W.2d 662, 666 (Mo. 1953);
see also Kohler, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 724-25.
165 Cudney, 254 S.W.2d at 666.
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The court in answering this question stated:
[I] t is not possible at this date, as it may be in another day, to say
that it is the common experience of mankind that commercial
airliners do not lurch and drop for some distance except for neg-
ligence in the operation of the plane and, therefore, it is not now
possible to confidently apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to
the mere occurrence in the circumstances relied upon by [the
plaintiff], as it is in the instance of certain crashes .... 166
The first condition therefore has been the biggest stumbling
block for plaintiffs attempting to invoke this doctrine for turbu-
lence-related injuries.
Kohler v. Aspen Airways is a more recent case illustrating this
difficulty and discussing numerous other cases that have refused
to apply the doctrine in this area. 167 The court, acknowledging
that res ipsa loquitur has been applied in a variety of airplane
accidents, refused to apply the doctrine to a "turbulence mis-
hap" since "generally res ipsa loquitur has not been applied
where natural conditions affect the airplane's operation.' 16
The court cited the Fifth Circuit decision of Kelly v. American
Airlines and noted that "' [the] overwhelming weight of authority
has declined to invoke res ipsa loquitur in air turbulence cases,'
because the first requirement of the doctrine, i.e., that the event
not usually occur in the absence of negligence, cannot be
met.' 69 The court also cited the New York Supreme Court deci-
sion in Sanchez v. American Airlines, which provided that
[sudden] changes in meteorological conditions which cause the
atmosphere to be disturbed, to become choppy and rough and
its motion irregular, whether referred to as turbulence or by any
other nomenclature, cannot be anticipated or avoided. The
lurching, dipping or bumping of an aircraft when such unex-
pected air currents are suddenly encountered certainly do not
spell out negligence on the part of the plane's operator. 7 °
Again, the basic premise on which plaintiffs are denied this
doctrine is that an encounter with air turbulence is not some-
16 Id. at 667.
167 Kohler, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 724-25.
168 Id. at 725.
169 Id. (citing Kelly v. American Airlines, Inc., 508 F.2d 1379, 1380 (5th Cir.
1975)).
170 Id. (citing Sanchez v. American Airlines, Inc., 106 Misc.2d 1010, 1013-14
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981)). For other decisions also refusing to allow res ipsa loquitur
in this area, see Gafford v. Trans-Texas Airways, 299 F.2d 60 (6th Cir. 1962);
Lazarus v. Eastern Air Lines, 292 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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thing that does not occur in the absence of negligence. As
stated earlier, this may be an accurate premise for most clear air
turbulence encounters, but it is not accurate for weather-related
or wake turbulence encounters. Both the knowledge of its possi-
ble presence and the continually improving weather detection
technology have come to the point where, for some forms of
turbulence, it can be said that an encounter does not occur
without negligence on the part of the airline. Some courts have
seemed at least willing to consider res ipsa loquitur in this area
where some testimony or evidence demonstrates that this type
of accident only occurs as a result of negligence. No case, how-
ever, has actually allowed the plaintiff use of the doctrine as a
substitute for the traditional negligence standard.171
A treatise on aviation accident law also provides that whether
or not res ipsa loquitur is to be applied to turbulence accidents
may itself be a question of fact that "may change as the aviation
and weather reporting sciences develop."'17 2 Thus, a strong case
can be made that res ipsa loquitur should now be available when
enough evidence can be presented to prove that the form of
turbulence was weather-related or wake turbulence, and, in the
relatively near future regarding clear air turbulence.
In cases involving weather-related or wake turbulence it may
be possible to provide evidence of weather forecasts, terrain fea-
tures, cloud formations, locations of other aircraft, and other
indicators that support the usage of the doctrine. Although not
eliminating the problem of imbalance of access to information,
this might reduce the amount of information required since the
threshold of evidence to get to the jury would be lower. For this
doctrine to be most effective towards meeting the goals set forth
above, it should be used to provide a presumption of negligence
requiring the defendant to proffer evidence showing that he was
not negligent. This would further alleviate the problem of im-
balance of information and technical knowledge by placing the
burden on the party who has access to most of the information.
The plaintiff would still be required to provide some evidence
that the encounter with turbulence was weather-related or wake
turbulence and not simply a clear air turbulence encounter.
But, beyond that, the burden would be on the airline to show
171 See Ness, 410 P.2d at 968-69 n. 84; see also Sanchez, 436 N.Y.S. 2d at 826 (find-
ing that no expert testimony was given to establish what might have caused the
incident or that this type of accident ordinarily occurs only due to negligence,
and concluding that the doctrine could not apply to this particular case).
172 KREINDLER, supra note 117, at 2-36.
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that it was not negligent in its operation of the airplane. This
would also place a greater awareness on the airline industry to
decrease these incidents, possibly at a sacrifice of greater fuel
consumption or fewer connecting flights, and foster greater
safety precautions in an industry that is a predominant aspect of
our society's transportation infrastructure.
To convince the majority of courts to extend the doctrine this
far, however, will be a difficult endeavor. Most jurisdictions in
other areas do not allow the doctrine to create a presumption of
negligence. At most they allow an inference of negligence
based on the circumstantial evidence as well as an avoidance of
the action's dismissal. The first step along this path may be at-
tainable, however. This involves pushing the courts beyond the
first condition and recognizing that encounters with most forms
of air turbulence do not normally occur without some negli-
gence on the part of the airline.
The second and third conditions for allowing res ipsa loquitur
are not as difficult for a plaintiff to meet in an air turbulence
case. The second condition requires that the event be caused by
an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the
defendant. Generally, the courts do not analyze this require-
ment too critically.173 At first glance, it appears quite obvious
that the airline is in total control of the operation of the aircraft
and most of the information associated therewith. But, some
complications may arise because of the control exercised by gov-
ernmental authorities in areas such as air traffic control, provi-
sion of weather information, and radio beams.174 Courts have
held, however that this external control by the government does
not eliminate the finding of exclusive control for the purposes
of res ipsa loquitur. 175
The third condition requires that the event must not have
been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of
the plaintiff. This involves, for example, findings such as con-
tributory negligence or assumption of risk on the part of the
plaintiff. A possible finding of contributory negligence would
involve a situation, for example, where an encounter with turbu-
lence was unavoidable, the plaintiff was warned of a potential
encounter, and yet the plaintiff failed to fasten his seat belt.
173 See id. at 2-51.
174 See id.
175 See id. (citing Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Rowe, 226 F.2d 365 (8th Cir. 1955);
Des Marais v. Beckman, 198 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1952); Trihey v. Transocean Air
Lines, Inc., 255 F.2d 824 (9th Cir. 1958)).
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These considerations need to be taken into account and ana-
lyzed on a case by case basis but, in general, absent any such
actions by the plaintiff, this third condition will not hinder the
invocation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
Unfortunately, moving towards this standard and away from a
straight negligence analysis will not affect the airline industry's
incentive to improve current turbulence detection technology
as would the application of strict liability. Under a straight neg-
ligence standard, an increase in the airline's ability to avoid tur-
bulence in turn increases their chances of incurring liability for
failure to do so. If res ipsa loquitur is applied, the airline would
still be at a greater risk of being held liable if their ability to
avoid turbulence is enhanced. Similarly, the more improve-
ments made in detection technology, the greater the argument
for application of res ipsa loquitur across the board for turbu-
lence incidents given that clear air turbulence would no longer
be an exception to detectability. In a strict liability scheme on
the other hand, the airlines would truly have a direct incentive
to detect any form of turbulence. This would allow them to
avoid liability either by warning passengers of an ensuing en-
counter or increasing their ability to circumnavigate a turbulent
area.
D. DISCUSSION OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE ANALOGIES
A well known doctrine in medical malpractice is "informed
consent." This doctrine deals with a medical professional's duty
to inform a patient of risks associated with the particular treat-
ment being performed.17 This doctrine stems from the prem-
ise that individual autonomy allows everyone the right to make
decisions regarding their own body. 77 The medical profes-
sional must provide sufficient information to permit a patient to
make an informed and intelligent decision regarding the pro-
posed medical treatment.17 This doctrine is very attractive
since individual autonomy is a basic right of every person and
most feel strongly about having this kind of control. Does this
doctrine have any use in the area of air turbulence liability? If
an airline is aware before a flight commences that turbulent and
stormy conditions are forecast for their flight path, do they have
a duty to warn the passengers of these conditions and allow




JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
them to decide for themselves whether they want to proceed
with the flight? The answer to this question appears to be yes."7 9
In Fleming v. Delta Airlines, weather forecasts included heavy
thunderstorms, surface wind gusts of 50 to 70 miles, cloud tops
to 45,000 feet, isolated tornadoes and hail storms, and moderate
to severe turbulence. 180 Although these conditions were not
necessarily extreme enough to prevent the flight from proceed-
ing, the court felt that they were serious enough to cause signifi-
cant concern to the passengers.' 81 The court provided that
[a]lthough an airline must bear the ultimate responsibility for
deciding whether conditions permit a safe flight, it need not and,
we think, must not arrogate to itself a decision which rightly be-
longs to each passenger, namely whether to fly under conditions
which, although not hazardous, might prove to be emotionally or
physically traumatizing .... [C]onditions may be dangerous to
some and not to others. Clearly, an airline cannot be expected
to screen the former from the latter. However, it owes its passen-
gers the duty to share with them information indicating such se-
rious weather disturbances, so that they can choose for
themselves whether they are physically and emotionally capable
of undertaking the trip and wish to do so. 18
2
It is not clear from this decision, or other similar decisions,
exactly what level of weather disturbance courts will require
before the airline is obligated to inform passengers of the
weather prior to a flight. This case provides one example where
the weather was serious enough to warrant a duty to inform.
In the medical context, the patient must also establish a
causal link between the failure to disclose the information and
the harm. 183 The patient met this burden by proving that had
he been informed of the risks, he would not have undergone
the treatment.'8 4 To analyze this, most courts utilize an objec-
tive standard such that liability attaches only if a "reasonable pa-
tient in the plaintiff's position would have withheld consent to
the treatment or procedure had the material risks been dis-
closed."' 85 Kohler v. Aspen Airways extended this causation re-
quirement to the air turbulence liability context. 186 In Kohler,
179 See Fleming v. Delta Airlines, 359 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
1so Id. at 341.
18, See id.
182 Id.
183 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, § 32, at 191.
184 See id.
185 Id.
186 Kohler, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 726.
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the weather forecast at flight time indicated clear weather with
occasional moderate turbulence.18 v This type of worst-case fore-
cast was supposedly very common and the forecast turbulence
was not usually experienced when the forecast was this genera-
lized. 8 The aircraft in this case did encounter severe clear air
turbulence resulting in injury to the plaintiff."9 The court held,
however, that since the plaintiff presented no evidence revealing
that a reasonably prudent person would have refused to take the
flight if warned of the possible air turbulence, the airline had no
duty to warn passengers of the hazardous forecast.190
This duty to warn, analogous to the medical profession's doc-
trine of informed consent, provides another manner in which
an airline can incur liability even if it does not negligently en-
counter turbulence or to warn the passengers during the flight
of an impending encounter with turbulence. The airline could
incur liability if it had access to information regarding the possi-
ble existence of inclement weather or potentially significant tur-
bulent conditions prior to the flight, yet failed to inform the
passengers to allow them to make an informed decision. The
passenger would, in most jurisdictions, have to prove that a rea-
sonably prudent person would have refused to take the flight in
question had he been warned of the possible air turbulence. A
minority of jurisdictions utilize a subjective question to establish
causation, whereby liability attaches if the particular plaintiff
would have avoided the flight had the information been pro-
vided. This constitutes a more protective scheme for passengers
that places a greater incentive on the airlines to distribute this
preflight information. It would, however, prove difficult to ad-
minister since it would be prone to self-serving testimony. Be-
cause some jurisdictions utilize this subjective standard in the
medical malpractice context, those jurisdictions could likely use
it in this context as well.
This doctrine is obviously not favored by airlines, and it has
not yet seen widespread usage. But if it does become widely re-
lied upon, it could force airlines into a general policy of inform-
ing passengers of these preflight conditions. This could lead to
the last minute loss of paying passengers and the inability to re-
sell seats because of the close proximity to flight time.
187 Id. at 721.
188 See id.
189 See id at 721-22.
190 See id. at 726.
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If applied, this doctrine may force airlines to raise the defense
of assumption of risk. They will argue that a passenger assumes
the risk of an encounter with turbulence if he receives warning
of the possibility of such an encounter but, nevertheless, decides
to proceed with the flight. This should not work to relieve the
airline of liability, however, if airline negligence actually causes
the encounter with turbulence. The passenger does possess
knowledge of the risk and voluntarily decides to accept it. But,
the passenger does not voluntarily assume the risk of airline neg-
ligence unnecessarily causing a turbulent encounter. The only
risk assumed is that turbulence may exist in the flight path and
the aircraft may encounter it absent any airline negligence.
Another well established doctrine in the medical malpractice
area is the mandatory requirement of expert testimony as a pre-
requisite to a holding of negligence. This requirement is based
on the premise that juries generally lack the competence to
judge technical and scientific medical questions.1"' The issue of
whether this requirement should extend to air turbulence litiga-
tion has been raised in at least one case. 19 2 In Arrow Aviation v.
Moore,"'93 the defendant airline argued that since lay jurors lack
general knowledge about aviation, and experts should be re-
quired in determining the requisite standard of care in estab-
lishing negligence.' The court rejected this argument and
stated that the rules of law applicable to torts on land, which do
not require mandatory expert testimony, should apply to these
cases. 195
The underlying premise of jury ignorance is arguably just as
applicable in this complex area as it is in the medical arena.
Simple cases will exist in which a jury can provide an educated
judgment without expert explanation. But even in medical mal-
practice, where a case appears quite clear and the underlying
premise of jury ignorance no longer exists, the mandatory re-
quirement for expert testimony is no longer strictly followed by
the courts.'96 Although somewhat favorable to the airlines, ap-
plication of this doctrine would not have much impact, because
in order to establish airline negligence, the testimony of experts
is practically required and utilized by plaintiffs.
191 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, § 32, at 188.
192 See Arrow Aviation, Inc. v. Moore, 266 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1959).
193 266 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1959).
194 Id. at 492.
195 See id. at 492-93.
196 See KEETON ET AL., supra note 60, § 32, at 189.
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IV. GOVERNMENT LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE OF
ATCS IN TURBULENCE CASES
The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) enacted in 1947, allows
a tort suit to proceed against the United States government.1 9 7
The government can incur liability "in the same manner and to
the same extent as a private individual under like circumstances,
but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or for puni-
tive damages. "198 Under this act, state common law determines
the form of the applicable cause of action. Under the FTCA,
the United States government can also incur liability for negli-
gent acts or omissions of FAA Flight Service Station (FSS) em-
ployees or ATCs.
When turbulent weather or wake turbulence conditions are
located near airports, ATCs can incur liability for negligent acts
or omissions that cause aircraft to encounter this turbulence.
"Air traffic controllers must be familiar and comply with the
mandatory provisions of the ATCM199 which pertain to their op-
erational responsibilities, and the ATCM instructs them to 'exer-
cise their best judgment' when confronted with situations not
specifically covered by the ATCM."200 ATCs, therefore, have a
duty to "give pilots all applicable information and warnings spec-
ified in the ATCM and, in certain situations, to take steps be-
yond those set forth in the ATCM where necessary to assure
pilot and passenger safety. '201 The court in First of America Bank
Central stated, however, that this duty to warn
does not arise unless the controller knows or should have known
of a danger .... [C]ontrollers, in the exercise of reasonable
care, have a duty to take wake turbulence hazards into considera-
tion when giving landing clearances, but they are not required to
anticipate or foresee negligent, grossly negligent or unlawful pi-
lot actions, and they have a right to rely upon the assumption
that pilots know and will abide by all applicable FARs, FAA advi-
sory circulars and AIM provisions.20 2
The key analysis in cases involving liability for actions (or
omissions) of an ATC includes the determination of causation
among the primary actors. Even where actions of the ATC are
197 See 28 U.S.C. § 2674 (1994).
198 Id.
199 ATCM is an acronym for "Air Traffic Control Manual".
2-00 First of America Bank-Central v. United States, 639 F. Supp. 446, 455 (W.D.
Mich. 1986).
201 Id.
202 Id. at 455-56.
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negligent, it must be determined whether these actions are a
proximate cause of the incident. Possible pilot negligence must
also be taken into account. Courts have traditionally placed sig-
nificant reliance on the "pilot in command" concept, which is
well entrenched in aviation law. The "pilot in command of an
aircraft is directly responsible for, and is the final authority as to,
the operation of [the] aircraft. ' 20 3 According to the FARs, the
pilot in command has a significant amount of discretion in an
emergency situation with authority to violate instructions of an
ATC if, in his judgment, safety so requires. 204 This final author-
ity of the pilot has traditionally allowed ATCs to escape liability.
Arguably, strict application of the pilot in command concept
creates a less safe environment by fostering a disincentive for
ATCs to perform their jobs with utmost caution.
Application of the pilot in command concept, although still
valid and widely used, has been somewhat relaxed. Many courts
recognize that ATCs and pilots have concurrent duties and re-
sponsibility for "safe conduct of the aircraft and safety of its pas-
sengers" and that pilot negligence "does not, in and of itself,
absolve the government of liability. '20 5 In most circumstances
the pilot bears a heavier burden if he possesses access to all the
information and has the last chance to avoid the accident. In
analyzing liability for a fatal encounter with weather related tur-
bulence, the court in In re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport
stated that "[a] ny failure of the air traffic controllers to warn a
pilot of the presence of a storm in his path cannot be regarded
as a continuing proximate cause after the pilot himself discov-
ered its presence, appreciated the danger, and decided to fly
ahead into it."'20 6 In that case the court found the air traffic con-
trollers negligent in not transmitting to the aircraft pertinent
weather information known to them before the crash.2 07 This
information included the presence of a thunderstorm at the ap-
203 RESPONSIBILITY AND AUTHORITY OF THE PILOT IN COMMAND, FEDERAL AVIA-
TION REGULATIONS § 91.3 (1990).
204 See id. ("In an in-flight emergency requiring immediate action, the pilot in
command may deviate from any rule of this part to the extent required to meet
that emergency.").
205 Rodriquez v. United States, 823 F.2d 735, 746 (3rd Cir. 1987); see also First
Bank of America Bank-Central, 639 F. Supp. at 455 (holding "Air traffic control-
lers are held to a standard of care for the safe conduct of planes and their passen-
gers which is concurrent with the duty of the pilot").





proach end of the runway, very heavy rain described by some as
a wall of water and by others as resembling a tornado, the pres-
ence of cloud to ground lightening in that area, and the pres-
ence of cumulonimbus clouds.2 °8 The district court found,
however, that the pilot knew all of the weather information that
was available from the ATC and was, in fact, aware of additional
conditions that were not known by the ATC.20 9 Based on this,
the court considered the failure of the ATC "to pass on the
weather information to have been inconsequential to the fate of
[the aircraft] in that there [was] no evidence that the crew
would have acted differently with this confirmation of informa-
tion already known." 210
In analyzing liability for a fatal encounter with wake turbu-
lence, the court in In re N-500L Cases stated that:
[a]lthough air traffic controllers may have responsibilities con-
current with those of the pilot in the terminal area, the primary
responsibility for avoiding collision and wake turbulence in VFR
conditions is with the pilot. This is so regardless of whether a
clearance has been given by the controller, because the pilot gen-
erally is in the best position to see other aircraft around him and
to visualize their vortex trails.211
In that case, the pilot of a small twin propeller aircraft in a
VFR landing approach had lost sight of a large Eastern Airlines
L-1O11 jumbo jet approaching the same runway.2 12 After in-
structions from the ATC establishing visual separation, the court
stated that the pilot assumed responsibility for providing his
own separation from the large jet.213 Two seconds after the
communication with the ATC, the L-1011 overtook the small
plane passing close enough for the L-1011 crewmen "to observe
the silhouettes of the small plane's passengers. "214 Approxi-
mately forty seconds after being overtaken, the small plane en-
countered wake turbulence generated by the L-1011, causing it
to crash, and killing all six people on board.215 Evidence was
shown that, after the small plane was overtaken, the pilot must




211 In re N-500L Cases, 691 F.2d at 28-29.
212 See id. at 27.
213 See id. at 29.
214 Id. at 27.
215 See id.
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out much difficulty. This would have given him enough time to
execute an evasive maneuver to avoid any potential wake
turbulence. 16
In re N-500L Cases is a typical example of the approach taken
by the courts regarding the responsibility of ATCs in wake turbu-
lence avoidance. Those courts still place significant weight on
the pilot in command concept, especially in a VFR landing situa-
tion. Yates v. United States, in finding the ATC negligent in con-
nection with an aircraft's fatal encounter with wake turbulence
during a VFR landing situation, placed less weight on the pilot
in command concept and greater recognition of the responsibil-
ity of the ATC.21 7 The court recognized the pilot's duty of care
and ability to react in these situations, but it also recognized the
unique position that ATCs are in, and thus, attributed a similar
duty to them. The court recognized, like many other courts do
in VFR landing situations, that ATCs and pilots have concurrent
obligations.2 18  This approach creates a greater incentive for
controllers to exercise extreme caution and care in their critical
roles. Due to the equipment they have, the information they
have access to, and their ability to monitor the whole situation,
they are in the best position to reduce the possibility of these
fatal situations developing and such a duty must not be taken
lightly. Although the FAA has published minimum separation
distances behind large and heavy aircraft to minimize wake tur-
bulence effects, pilots cannot realistically assess the exact separa-
tion distance like ATCs can. The court in Yates stated that
[t]he relationship between the air controller and the pilot of a
plane which is landing or taking off creates a duty of care on the
part of the controller.... A pilot has a choice before he commits
himself to a landing, but after the commitment he is not free to
change his course and thereafter he is controlled by the control-
ler.... We cannot, therefore, accept the view that the controllers
with the complex equipment which they employ are there merely
to give advice. 19
Most courts, however, still place a greater responsibility on the
pilots, especially in VFR landing situations, for maintaining the
proper separation necessary for wake turbulence avoidance.
216 See id.
217 Yates, 497 F.2d at 881.
218 For other cases applying this type of analysis see In re Greenwood Air Crash,
924 F. Supp 1518 (S.D. Ind. 1995); Mattschei v. United States, 600 F.2d 205 (9th
Cir. 1979).
219 Yates, 497 F.2d at 882-83.
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This diminishes the responsibility and incentive for ATCs to use
due care and, unfortunately, places pilots in a more dangerous
situation when performing a visual landing procedure.
V. WARSAW CONVENTION
For cases dealing with turbulence encounters in international
flights, the Warsaw Convention may preempt state law. The
Warsaw Convention applies to all actions against an airline for
injuries sustained in an accident that "[takes] place on board
the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of embark-
ing or disembarking."22 ° The term "accident" is defined as "an
unexpected or unusual event or happening that is external to
the passenger. "221 In Cheng v. United Airlines, all parties agreed
that the turbulence encountered by the aircraft in that case,
qualified as an "accident" under the Warsaw Convention.22
However, that does not end the inquiry. Although the turbu-
lence encounter constitutes an "accident," more is required to
implicate the Warsaw Convention. 3  The injuries sustained
must also have been caused by the accident in question. 24
Chang, quoting the Supreme Court decision in Saks stated that
"'[a] ny injury is the product of a chain of causes, and [for the
Convention to apply] we require only that the passenger be able
to prove that some link in the chain was an unusual or unex-
pected event external to the passenger.' "225 Thus, an action for
injuries sustained by a passenger in a turbulence encounter in
an international flight would likely trigger the Warsaw
Convention.
Where the Convention applies, it preempts all of a plaintiffs
state law claims.2 6 What this entails exactly and how it effects
the state law claims and the duty of care required by the airline
is not clear and depends on the interpretation of the Supreme
Court's decision in Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co.2 2 7 as well as
numerous lower court decisions.2
22 Warsaw Convention, Art. 17.
221 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 405 (1985).
222 See Cheng v. United Airlines, Inc., 1995 WL 42157 at *3 (ND Ill. Jan. 31,
1995).




227 Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co., 116 S. Ct. 629 (1996).
228 See, e.g., In re Air Crash in Bali, Indonesia, 684 F.2d 1301 (9th Cir. 1982);
Floyd v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. 872 F.2d 1462 (11th Cir. 1989); Abramson v. Japan
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VI. CONCLUSION
When attempting to investigate the liability of an airline or
the government in an air turbulence incident, a determination
of the particular form of turbulence encountered should be the
primary inquiry. Three general categories of turbulence exist-
clear air turbulence, weather-related turbulence, and wake tur-
bulence. The form of turbulence encountered in a given inci-
dent bears significantly on the type of liability analysis
performed and thus could also have a significant impact on the
outcome of a case. Pilots, airline officials, and ATCs each have
certain duties in avoiding or circumventing turbulent areas or
otherwise preventing harmful consequences from transpiring
upon an imminent encounter. The duties required of these in-
dividuals vary depending on the form of turbulence encoun-
tered. Thus, the form of turbulence encountered in a particular
situation, as well as the related duties of the individuals, must be
taken into account.
Currently, liability of an airline for injuries caused by en-
counters with turbulence is based on standard negligence analy-
sis. An airline can be negligent in a number of ways including:
flying into or in the area of a storm, failing to maintain a proper
distance from a storm area, failure to warn passengers of an im-
minent and unavoidable encounter with turbulence, failure to
slow down or take other necessary precautions when a storm or
other turbulence is encountered, failure to obtain weather in-
formation available to the pilot, failure of one flight to warn
others of certain weather conditions it has encountered, failure
of weather dispatchers to advise flights of certain known weather
conditions, and violations of FARs or other airline manuals.
The above examples illustrate that a number of different ways
exist in which an airline can incur liability under the traditional
negligence analysis. A number of technological changes in the
aviation industry and society in general, however, may warrant
application of a harsher liability standard and thus, a deviation
from this traditional analysis. A liability standard that considers
up front the form of turbulence encountered may comprise the
most appealing and equitable solution. The driving factors be-
hind such a shift in liability analysis include the seemingly in-
Airlines Co., 739 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1984); Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics,
Inc. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 737 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1984). For a
discussion of these and other cases see LEE S. KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW
§ 10.08, at 10-101 (Mathew Bender, revised 1998).
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creasing number of turbulence-related injuries, the ever-
increasing pressure on airlines to cut costs and meet demanding
schedules, the imbalance of access to critical information and
knowledge regarding flights and surrounding conditions, the
highly technical nature of aviation and meteorology, and the
general acceptance of aviation as an everyday form of travel.
The chosen liability standard must foster an incentive for air-
lines to continue to research and to improve detection technol-
ogy and their ability to avoid turbulence. The standard
negligence analysis actually punishes airlines for their efforts in
this regard by imposing a greater risk of incurring liability with
increased turbulence-detection capabilities.
Some proposed variations in the liability analysis include: (1)
a strict liability scheme for all forms of turbulence; (2) a less
rigid strict liability scheme that takes into account the type of
turbulence encountered and thus differentiates a compensable
injury, such as one associated with an encounter with weather-
related or wake turbulence, from others not recoverable under
strict liability, such as an encounter with pure clear air turbu-
lence; or (3) a negligence system that permits the use of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to shift some of the burdens to the
airline or government when the form of turbulence is initially
shown to have been wake or weather-related.
Some medical malpractice analogies have arisen in the con-
text of air turbulence litigation that warrant consideration. Ap-
plication of the doctrine of informed consent in the air
turbulence arena is attractive but presents a host of unresolved
issues in its application and potential effect. Its attraction stems
from a belief that, similar to the medical area, every person has a
basic right of individual autonomy. Thus, they possess the abil-
ity to decide, before a flight begins, whether they want to pro-
ceed given the known potential for an encounter with
turbulence or bad weather. A lot of unanswered questions exist
regarding how this would affect the respective liabilities of the
airline and its passengers and there are aspects of its application
that could prove to be detrimental to both. Several cases have
already addressed the issue and thus, its future application in
this area warrants debate. Another medical malpractice doc-
trine that may apply in this area is the mandatory use of expert
witnesses prior to a finding of liability. Even if applied here,
however, this doctrine should not have much impact.
Causation issues, especially in wake turbulence encounters,
have given courts difficulty in determining whether an airline or
11991999]
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ATC is liable for a particular encounter. Blanket use of the
somewhat antiquated concept of "pilot in command" may place
too great a responsibility on the pilots and a correspondingly
small responsibility on the ATCs. ATCs, with their equipment,
access to critical information, and ability to monitor the whole
situation are in a very unique position to reduce the possibility
of these fatal situations developing. Recognizing this, and im-
posing concurrent obligations on both the ATC and pilot, even
in VFR landing situations, creates a greater incentive for ATCs
to exercise extreme care and caution in their vital roles.
Finally, turbulence is not only a domestic concern, but is en-
countered quite frequently in international flights as well. This
may require application of the Warsaw Convention. It is unclear
exactly how its application will impact the analysis but it may
preempt state law, limit liability, and require a different duty of
care than expected.
